Fortress Newfoundland: How the Fear of Nazi Attack Turned Newfoundland into an Armed Camp during World War II by Collins, Paul
RESEARCH NOTES
Fortress Newfoundland: How the Fear of
Nazi Attack Turned Newfoundland into an
Armed Camp during World War II
PAUL COLLINS
ONE OF THE MORE popular local myths to come out of World War II was that the
Germans planned to attack and possibly occupy parts of Newfoundland. This paper
seeks to demonstrate, through published and archival evidence, that the threat of a
German attack did have substance and was seen by the civilian and military authori-
ties as being a real and imminent danger. The Dominion was strategically located at
the crossroads to North America and would have offered the Nazis a target-rich en-
vironment had they actually struck. It boasted two naval bases, five military and ci-
vilian aerodromes, two seaplane bases, five army bases, and a variety of civilian
assets important to the Allied war effort. Some anecdotal evidence even suggests
that Hitler, at least briefly, considered an assault on Newfoundland as part of a
larger campaign against the United States.
1
The Germans never did attack New-
foundland in a concerted manner, yet the mere possibility forced the Allies to turn
the country into an island fortress.
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When it entered the war as part of the British Empire, Newfoundland was to-
tally defenceless. The country had always relied on the protection of the Royal
Navy (RN) and again looked to Britain for security. The Admiralty, however, felt
that the threat to Newfoundland was slight and, as during the Great War, promised
to come to the rescue when and if danger actually materialized.
2
As a retired Royal
Navy Vice Admiral, Newfoundland’s Governor Sir Humphrey Walwyn probably
recognized the hollowness of these assurances and, deeply concerned about the
vulnerability of shipping in St. John’s harbour, requested keeping the four-inch gun
off the damaged SS King Edward, which was being repaired at the Newfoundland
Dockyard.
3
In any event, the Newfoundland Commission of Government could
take its own measures, and these were immediately initiated. The British Overseas
Defence Committee had formulated a Newfoundland Defence Scheme in 1936 that
dictated steps to be taken at each stage up to and including the outbreak of war: The
Peace Stage speaks for itself; the Precautionary Stage was defined as when rela-
tions with another power were so strained as to take precautions against hostilities;
and the War Stage outlined planning for when war had actually broken out. The
scheme set out when and how various warning telegrams would be sent and what
actions should be taken upon receipt. Among the immediate measures to be imple-
mented were the seizure of all ships belonging to the enemy, the detention of all
British and neutral ships loaded with contraband believed to be destined for the en-
emy, and, finally, the prevention from clearing port of any British ships headed for
an enemy destination.
4
As St. John’s and many of Newfoundland’s ports were in-
ternational in nature, these instructions had significant repercussions. Much of the
iron ore mined at Wabana, Bell Island, and the lead and zinc mined at Buchans were
shipped to Germany, and German vessels were constant visitors at Botwood,
Lewisporte, and Corner Brook.
5
Captain C.M.R. Schwerdt, RN, Walwyn’s private
secretary, was appointed Naval Officer in Charge (NOIC) and immediately estab-
lished a Naval Control Service office and set about implementing the Newfound-
land Defence Scheme.
6
One of his first actions as NOIC was to order the seizure of
the Christoph von Doornun at Botwood and the internment of her crew.
7
At an emergency meeting of the Commission, Walwyn instituted committees
to examine such serious issues as censorship, recruitment, currency, rationing, and
of course, defence.
8
Among the Governor’s major concerns were the two airports.
The Newfoundland Airport at Gander Lake and the transatlantic seaplane base at
Botwood were developed during the 1930s for civilian purposes by the Newfound-
land and British governments. Authorities feared that the Germans might try to
neutralize both facilities as a strictly defensive measure or, even more worrisome,
acquire them for their own use in hostilities against Canada and the United States.
Should the Nazis get a foothold in Newfoundland, the whole east coast of Canada
and the United States could be threatened.
9
Indeed, Ottawa worried that if the Ger-
mans “were given six hours on a piece of land where they intended to establish an
air base they could never be dislodged.”
10
The Dominions Office approved
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Walwyn’s request to form a Newfoundland Defence Force to protect the airports
and dispatched training officers and a limited amount of equipment from Britain.
11
In the meantime, the Governor suggested that the Canadians be invited to take over
the protection of both the Gander and Botwood facilities for the duration.
12
The
British Air Ministry rejected this, as London was afraid that once they got in, the
Canadians would be hard to dislodge, and these two airports would be very impor-
tant to civil aviation after the war.
13
Actually, Canada made the commitment to defend Newfoundland even before
it entered the war against Germany.
14
Not only did Ottawa consider Newfoundland
to be an “essential Canadian interest” and an important part of the “Canadian or-
bit,”
15
but Prime Minister Mackenzie King argued in September 1939 that by guar-
anteeing Newfoundland’s safety, Canada would actually be assisting Britain’s war
effort by relieving it of that responsibility.
16
In reality, Newfoundland presented a
number of potential targets important to Canada besides the airport at Gander and
the seaplane base at Botwood: the iron ore mines on Bell Island provided the ore for
the steel mills in Cape Breton, which produced one-third of Canada’s steel output;
the numerous cable and wireless stations along the coast were critical for communi-
cations; and of course, the city of St. John’s was the economic and political centre
of Newfoundland.
17
Indeed, Governor Walwyn lamented that it was “quite appar-
ent that Newfoundland [was] being considered only in so far as the defence of Can-
ada [was] concerned.”
18
During the “Phoney War” in Europe, the Canadian government did not act on
its commitment to Newfoundland’s defence.
19
In fact, upon visiting Ottawa in
March 1940 to discuss Canada’s defence plans for Newfoundland, Commissioner
for Justice and Defence L.E. Emerson learned that no preparations had been made.
In meetings with the Chief of the General Staff, Major General T.V. Anderson, the
head of the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN), Rear Admiral Percy Nelles, and the Royal
Canadian Air Force (RCAF) Chief, Air Vice Marshal G.M. Croil, Emerson discov-
ered that no instructions had been issued relating to Newfoundland other than for
the defence of Bell Island and those parts of the coast that were important to the de-
fence of Canada. No provisions at all had been made to base anything in Newfound-
land to protect the populous but very vulnerable coast stretching from Cape Freels
at the head of Bonavista Bay to Cape Race at the southern tip of the Avalon Peninsula.
During his March meetings, Emerson suggested at least basing reconnaissance sea-
planes at Bay Bulls or Trepassey on the Southern Shore, or even somewhere in St.
Mary’s Bay or Placentia Bay. The Canadians regretted that “they did not have any
planes to spare,” but they did offer to train men to man the guns on Bell Island.
20
This state of affairs changed as the German blitzkrieg swept through France
and the Low Countries in the spring of 1940. In June, Ottawa dispatched the 1st
Battalion of the Black Watch of Canada to Botwood and stationed five Douglas
Digby bombers from RCAF No. 10 Squadron at Gander.
21
Nevertheless, it did not
take long before the first invasion scare occurred. In early July, authorities received
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intelligence that U-boats were going to set up an advance base at Cape Bauld at the
tip of the Great Northern Peninsula. Canadian troops were landed, aided by HMCS
Ottawa, but no evidence of a German incursion was found and the troops were
withdrawn.
22
In the meantime, at a meeting held at the Colonial Building in St.
John’s, Major General Anderson and various government and local military offi-
cials discussed defensive measures in the event of an enemy attack. Lewisporte was
seen as a likely insertion point for any enemy force intent on capturing the New-
foundland Airport. The Commissioner of Public Utilities, Sir Wilfrid Woods, in-
formed the meeting that arrangements were being made, including an all-night
telegraph watch, to immediately alert the airport should the enemy land at Lewis-
porte. Anderson recommended that Canadian troops draw up demolition plans for
the Newfoundland Railway and also guard certain focal points along the line, in the
event that an enemy force tried to seize one or more locomotives. Anderson was
further concerned about the runway at Harbour Grace, which was long enough to
accommodate enemy aircraft. Unwilling to make the site permanently unusable, he
suggested temporary measures and Commissioner Woods recommended that large
boulders be placed along the ground to temporarily block it.
23
Meanwhile, the sites for two 4.7-inch and two 10-inch guns had been selected
at Signal Hill and Cape Spear, respectively, and a further two 6-inch guns were
proposed on top of the 75-mm examination battery already in place at Fort
Amherst.
24
Even so, Captain Schwerdt worried that an enemy cruiser or raider with
6-inch guns could easily silence the Fort Amherst battery, and systematically
pound the harbour and town for at least an hour before planes from Gander, 135
miles distant, could arrive — assuming the weather co-operated.
25
His fears were
somewhat alleviated with the news that four 155-mm mobile guns, four 3-inch
anti-aircraft (AA) guns, and a number of smaller AA guns, as well as an ample supply
of ammunition, were due at St. John’s in January 1941 along with 1,000 American
troops on the Edmund B. Alexander as part of the famous Anglo-American “de-
stroyers for bases” deal.
26
In the summer of 1940, the British were dangerously short of destroyers for
convoy escort duty. The Royal Navy lost a large number during the ill-fated Nor-
wegian campaign and the evacuation at Dunkirk, with still more being sunk or dam-
aged while held in port to counter the expected German invasion of Britain. Prime
Minister Winston Churchill appealed to US President Franklin Roosevelt in May
for “forty or fifty of [his] older destroyers” to fill the breach until new construction
compensated for the losses.
27
Roosevelt was more than willing to do this, but the
United States was officially neutral and such a transfer would contravene interna-
tional law as well as inflame isolationist sentiment in the US. The answer seemed to
be an exchange of sorts. As a gesture of friendship, Churchill proposed that Britain
would allow the US to lease land on British territory in the western hemisphere for
bases, and a reciprocal gesture would be made of the destroyers as well as other mil-
itary hardware. Unfortunately, this remedy was too subtle for American policy-
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makers, who preferred a more direct and documented swap. On the other hand, a
straight exchange of assets would not have gone down well in the territories in-
volved or in Britain. British Minister of Supply Lord Beaverbrook opined that if the
British were going to make a bargain, he did not want to make a bad one, and in his
opinion, granting British territory to the Americans for 99 years in exchange for 50
overage destroyers was a bad deal.
28
The solution came in a compromise that gave the British their gesture and the
Americans their business deal. Leases would be given “freely and without consid-
eration” to the Americans in Newfoundland and Bermuda, while similar facilities
would be traded in Jamaica, Trinidad, British Guiana, St. Lucia, and Antigua for the
50 destroyers. This solved the problem, and the “destroyers for bases” deal, as it
became known, was announced on 3 September 1940.
29
Ultimately, the United
States developed facilities at St. John’s (Fort Pepperell/Camp Alexander), Torbay,
Argentia (Argentia Naval/Air Station/Fort McAndrew), Gander, Stephenville
(Harmon Air Force Base/Camp Morris), and eventually Goose Bay, Labrador. By
war’s end, tens of thousands of American servicemen had been stationed in New-
foundland and Labrador, and hundreds of thousands of US military personnel and
passengers had passed through the various US facilities throughout the country.
30
Despite the troops and equipment landed on the Alexander, Roosevelt still had con-
cerns about North America’s most important outpost and proposed to Churchill
that the US send an additional half battery of 8-inch guns, one squadron of three me-
dium and three heavy bombers, and 57 officers and 575 men to bolster Newfound-
land’s defences.
31
The Canadians were justifiably concerned about this tremendous buildup of
American forces in what they rightly considered their own front yard. Ottawa
viewed Newfoundland as the “key to the gulf of Canada” and “in many ways [its]
first line of defence.”
32
Nevertheless, the Anglo-American Staff Agreement, signed
without Canadian participation in early 1941, assigned the United States strategic
control over the Western Atlantic. The Canadian government feared that this agree-
ment was an attempt to oust Canada from Newfoundland
33
and worried about a per-
manent American presence in the Dominion.
34
It was clear that Canada needed to
impress upon its allies the “vital nature” of its interest in Newfoundland.
35
As
Malcolm MacLeod noted, “Canada was determined to become a weighty presence
in Newfoundland, both for the sake of winning the war and for future consider-
ations.”
36
Consequently, by the fall of 1940, Canadian contractors were building Camp
Lester on the outskirts of the city and the newly appointed Commander, Combined
Newfoundland and Canadian Military Forces, Brigadier P. Earnshaw, arrived at St.
John’s in November. By the end of the year, 775 men from the Canadian 53rd In-
fantry Battalion had arrived to defend St. John’s.
37
The Royal Canadian Navy had
also appeared in Newfoundland shortly after the Anglo-American Leased Bases
Agreement announcement (actually signed 17 March 1941) and set up a Naval Ex-
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amination Service to control shipping entering St. John’s harbour and provide fur-
ther defence for the facilities. Naval Service Headquarters assigned HMCS Amber
for duty as an examination vessel and NOIC Schwerdt set up a Port War Signal Sta-
tion in Cabot Tower on Signal Hill.
38
By the following June, the Canadians had
turned St. John’s into a well-defended harbour and home base for the Newfound-
land Escort Force (NEF), which protected the vital transatlantic convoys to Brit-
ain,
39
plus the Newfoundland Defence Force (NDF) comprising five corvettes, two
minesweepers, and four Fairmile patrol boats. In addition, Captain Schwerdt and
his staff arranged to install an anti-torpedo baffle in The Narrows, and enlarged the
Examination Service by enlisting two former Newfoundland Customs cutters,
Marvita and Shulamite, complete with their crews. A 4,000-ton Admiralty fuel tank
was under construction on the south side of the harbour, and a Port War Signal Sta-
tion was planned for Cape Spear in addition to a High Frequency Direction Finding
(HF/DF, or Huff Duff) station and a radio beacon. One RCN leading signalman and
five ratings manned the Cabot Tower Port War Signal Station, and Fort Amherst
was fortified as an Examination Battery including four RCN signalmen.
40
The Cana-
dian Army completed this battery in the fall of 1941; in the interim, American
troops manned four mobile 155-millimetre guns and two 8-inch railway guns in
and around St. John’s for defence.
41
In addition, a continuous listening watch at
several Department of Posts and Telegraph wireless stations outside St. John’s was
in contact with approximately 100 low-power wireless stations throughout the
coastal regions of Newfoundland. Observers were instructed to report any and all
aircraft — especially at night — as well as any unidentified ships, gear, or wreck-
age.
42
This led to a mine being reported by a Newfoundland Ranger in La Scie on
the Baie Verte Peninsula in mid-August 1941. It had been picked up off Horse Is-
lands by a local resident and towed ashore. Apparently the finder had hoisted it onto
the pier and with the help of several local men then rolled it a considerable distance
to his storehouse. The ranger suggested that it was miraculous that “all the people
living in the little cove ... were not blown to pieces.”
43
Meanwhile, the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) started construction on an
air base near the community of Torbay just outside St. John’s. Aircraft stationed
there would provide protection for St. John’s and Bell Island, as well as patrol the
convoy routes east of Newfoundland. Group Headquarters was established at St.
John’s under the command of Group Captain C.M. McEwen during the summer of
1941, and RCAF Station Torbay opened in October with two runways. Patrols com-
menced when four Hudson bombers from No. 2 (British) Squadron arrived from
Nova Scotia the following month.
44
In February 1942, due to the dramatic increase
in passenger traffic between Canada and Newfoundland, Canada initiated a regular
Trans-Canada Airlines service between the two dominions.
45
With the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941 and the subse-
quent German declaration of war, the Americans became full participants in the
worldwide conflict. Their facilities throughout Newfoundland were an integral part
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of western hemispheric defence, and local military authorities seriously addressed
the issue of Newfoundland’s vulnerability to attack. The commander of American
forces in Newfoundland, Major General G.C. Brant, felt that an assault on New-
foundland was not only possible “but very probable.” Smarting from the Pearl Har-
bor attack, he worried that aircraft catapulted from merchant ships would spearhead
any strike.
46
Indeed, the Kriegsmarine had four aircraft catapult ships, which naval
authorities felt would be the most likely vehicles for any assault on Newfoundland,
particularly St. John’s. They had the range and endurance, and two could carry mul-
tiple aircraft. The others carried at least one aircraft and all could be used as mother
ships for a larger force.
47
With this in mind, the Allied service heads in Newfound-
land met with select members of the Newfoundland government at Commissioner
Emerson’s office in the Colonial Building to discuss defence arrangements for St.
John’s. They agreed that an attack would come from the sea and most likely take the
form of an air assault.
48
Consequently, a comprehensive blackout regime was dis-
cussed. Emerson proposed a two-week continuous blackout commencing at the
end of January, with the regulations covering all of St. John’s and surrounding area,
including Conception Bay. The committee decided that air raid shelters were im-
practical since an effective shelter needed to be at least 30 feet underground to pro-
tect against high-explosive bombs, and St. John’s, for the most part, sits on solid
rock. Further, as an air assault would be sea-launched and thus be limited in size, a
sustained attack was not anticipated and would probably be over before people
could get to shelters. Thus, the committee felt that the main cause of casualties
would be falling debris and splinters. Experience in Britain showed that the best de-
fence against this was for people to stay in their homes, under stairs, or in cupboards
or pantries, and to tape or board up windows.
49
In any event, the committee thought
that attacking forces would probably use incendiaries rather than high-explosive
bombs, so fire actually posed the biggest danger.
50
A strike against St. John’s would concentrate on shipping and the docks, but
any attack, especially with incendiaries, would pose a serious fire hazard to the
whole area. Retired Lieutenant Colonel Leonard Outerbridge was appointed Direc-
tor of Civil Defence and immediately sought to co-ordinate his air raid measures
with the various fighting services, and liaison officers from each service were ap-
pointed to his staff.
51
At the ready were the local Auxiliary Fire Service, the RCAF
fire unit at Torbay, and the US Army fire unit at Fort Pepperell, the American base
on Quidi Vidi Lake. In addition, authorities encouraged home and business owners
to take their own fire precautions, including distributing sandbags and 2,300 stirrup
pumps. Fire wardens were also organized and could be called out in the event of at-
tack. In the event of need, the Americans offered Camp Alexander on Carpasian
Road as emergency accommodation for up to 2,000 people, plus their facilities at
the Torbay airport and the Argentia Naval/Air Station, as well as mobile kitchens to
feed fire fighters and those forced to evacuate their homes. Homeowners would be
asked to stockpile several days’ essential supplies for an emergency.
52
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As if to add immediacy to the threat, on 28 January a US shore battery at Logy
Bay reported a large ship about five miles offshore launching an aircraft. Admiral
Leonard Murray, RCN, the Flag Officer, Newfoundland Force (FONF), immediately
sent HMCS Dauphin to investigate but the ship returned having found nothing suspi-
cious.
53
Nevertheless, authorities were nervous and they became even more so on
the evening of 3 March when three large explosions shook the Southside Hills. It
took a couple of days before the cause could be confirmed, but Admiral Murray sus-
pected it was a U-boat attack.
54
In early February, the Americans had detected “def-
inite sound contacts” in Placentia Bay, not far from their base at Argentia,
55
and on
1 March a US patrol plane sighted and sank a U-boat 25 miles south of Trepassey,
the first American U-boat kill of the war.
56
Torpedo fragments were eventually re-
covered from the rocks below Fort Amherst a few days later, which proved that tor-
pedoes had been fired at St. John’s harbour, probably from long range.
57
However,
authorities puzzled as to why a U-boat commander would waste valuable torpedoes
firing at (and missing) the entrance of an obviously defended port.
58
The mouth of
St. John’s harbour is called “The Narrows” for a reason, so perhaps Kapitän-
leutnant Ulrich Borcherdt in U-587 was attempting to seal it or possibly test the har-
bour defences, but his motives will never be known as the U-boat was lost with all
hands a few weeks later (27 March).
59
Possibly prompted by this attack, the New-
foundland government requested a meeting with Allied service heads to discuss de-
nial plans should the Germans mount some sort of landing at St. John’s. At this
meeting, Commissioner Emerson distributed “Instructions Issued To Certain
Colonial Dependencies on ‘Scorched Earth Policy’,” based on British Scorched
Earth Plans formulated in the summer of 1940.
60
As his forces and facilities constituted major targets in St. John’s harbour, Ad-
miral Murray ordered his staff, under the chair of Captain (D) E.R. Mainguy, RCN,
to draft a proposal for the destruction of the RCN facilities. By September, Captain
Mainguy, now acting as interim FONF, issued copies of “Denial Plans — Naval In-
stallations, Equipment and Supplies” to the other service heads. The RCN plans
were comprehensive and fraught with danger. Fire was to be the main means of de-
struction. The RCN buildings in St. John’s would be burned. The Newfoundland and
Naval dockyards would be demolished using depth charges, naval vehicles would
be driven off wharves, and the harbour entrance sealed with block ships. The au-
thors expressed their concerns as to how best to destroy the naval ordnance facili-
ties and the Admiralty and Imperial Oil fuel tanks on the south side of the harbour.
The easiest and most effective means of destroying the fuel stocks was simply to
open or smash the valves and ignite the leaking fuel. However, the authors cau-
tioned that if this were done, it could “result in a fire, the extent of which cannot be
gauged.” Even if the fuel was not ignited and was simply contained behind the con-
crete retaining walls surrounding the tanks, the authors cautioned that the fire haz-
ard would still be great.
61
Schwerdt, now Captain of the Port of St. John’s, felt that
preventing an enemy landing in the first place and deterring sabotage by fifth col-
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umnists were more important than a “scorched earth policy.” Nevertheless, these
plans remained in force until a month after D-Day (6 June 1944) when “the im-
proved strategic situation” prompted the Chiefs of Staff Committee in Ottawa to
cancel the scorched earth policy for both the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.
62
Perhaps at Schwerdt’s urging, a full-scale air raid drill was carried out in St.
John’s during May 1942, involving both the fighting services and the civil defence
authorities. It revealed a number of serious deficiencies in both equipment and or-
ganization. The drill showed clearly that there was an acute lack of fire-fighting
equipment, first aid stations, and gas masks and decontamination units for the civil-
ian population.
63
Even before these deficiencies could be cured, St. John’s experi-
enced an air raid scare. In early June, the mayor of St. John’s, Albert Carnell,
phoned Commissioner for Defence Emerson from Montreal with supposedly reli-
able information that a number of enemy aircraft would attack St. John’s on 10
June. A “yellow” alert was issued, and all air raid measures were instigated for the
nights of both 9 and 10 June, although only the fighting services stayed on high alert
on the 10th.
64
No raid occurred, but if anybody thought that the threat was falla-
cious, this impression was dispelled by three U-boat attacks close to home in the
fall.
On the night of 4 September U-513, under the command of Kapitänleutnant
Rolf Ruggeberg, followed the ore carrier Evelyn B into the Wabana anchorage in
Conception Bay. Spending the night submerged, Ruggeberg rose to periscope
depth the next morning and sank two ships, SS Saganaga and SS Lord Strathcona.
Slightly damaged by a collision with Strathcona, U-513 left the scene, once again
trailing Evelyn B. Twenty-nine men were killed in the attack, all aboard Sagan-
aga.
65
Nothing appeared in the press about this incident, no doubt the result of the
strict censorship regime in place, but news quickly spread.
66
The public was shaken
because the attack had occurred in broad daylight, in an inshore protected anchor-
age. Captain Mainguy complained that while the public accepted losses in convoys
as the “fortunes of war,” it blamed sinkings so close to St. John’s on “dereliction of
duty on the part of the Navy.”
67
To possibly assuage public fears, the RCN, RCAF, Canadian Army, United
States Army, and US Army Air Corps, plus the local Air Raid Precautions (ARP) or-
ganization, conducted combined manoeuvres later in the month. The exercise took
the form of a mock landing some distance outside St. John’s and thoroughly tested
the defence preparedness of the local command. Overall, the exercise was a success
and afforded the opportunity to improve defence arrangements still further.
68
Un-
fortunately, whatever goodwill this exercise created was negated the following
month by the sinking of the Sydney-Port-aux-Basque ferry, SS Caribou.
Caribou left Sydney for its last trip at approximately 9:30 p.m. on 13 October
escorted by the Bangor minesweeper HMCS Grandmere. Early the following morn-
ing, U-69 under the command of Kapitänleutnant Ulrich Gräf spotted Caribou and
misidentified both the 2,222-ton Caribou and 600-ton Grandmere as a 6,500-ton
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passenger freighter and a “two-stack destroyer.” Shortly thereafter, he hit Caribou
on her starboard side with a lone torpedo and the ship quickly sank, leaving many
swimming for their lives in the freezing waters of the Gulf of St. Lawrence.
Grandmere attacked the U-boat, dropping several patterns of depth charges over
the next couple of hours, but having achieved no results gave up the hunt and began
to pick up survivors. By this time, of the 237 people aboard, only 103 were found
alive and two died shortly thereafter.
69
Of the 46-man crew, mostly Newfound-
landers from the Channel/Port-aux-Basques area, only 15 remained. Five families
were decimated: the Tappers (five dead), Toppers (four), Allens (three), Skinners
(three), and Tavernors (the captain and his two sons). The St. John’s Evening Tele-
gram reported that the disaster left 21 widows and 51 orphans in the Channel/Port-
aux-Basques area of Newfoundland.
70
So shaken were the residents of the area,
they petitioned the government to strengthen fortifications and institute a blackout.
After an investigation, authorities felt that defences were adequate — Harmon Air
Force Base in Stephenville was only a short flight away — and a blackout would
cause more difficulties for the residents than was warranted by what they consid-
ered a minimal threat of attack.
71
As if to undermine this assessment, the ore carriers
at Bell Island were once again targeted by a German U-boat.
At approximately 3 a.m. on 2 November, U-518, under the command of
Kapitänleutnant Friedrich Wissmann, entered the sheltered Wabana anchorage
and found several anchored ore carriers silhouetted in the beam of a searchlight.
Shortly thereafter, he fired one torpedo at the 3,000-ton Anna T, which missed
and exploded ashore at the loading dock. With the anchorage now fully alerted,
Wissmann quickly sank SS Rose Castle, taking 28 of her crew with her, five of
whom were Newfoundlanders, and the Free French vessel PLM 27 with the loss of
12 men. In the ensuing confusion, and despite the presence of a corvette and two
Fairmile patrol boats, U-518 escaped on the surface in the darkness. In a 10-minute
attack, two ships, along with 40 men, had been lost.
72
Admiral Walwyn was outraged at the sinkings. He had been on a hillside over-
looking the anchorage the previous day, and was horrified to see two ore ships at an-
chor awaiting a loading berth. Walwyn told naval authorities that he thought it was
“madness” to let the ships loiter unprotected at the anchorage. The Governor felt it
was wiser to leave them in St. John’s until a berth was vacant and incorrectly sus-
pected that the same perpetrator of the September attack was probably responsible
this time.
73
The Dominions Office was equally critical of local naval authorities,
concluding that the incident “reflect[ed] little credit on those in charge.”
74
In fair-
ness, the newly appointed FONF, Commodore H.E. Reid, did the best he could with
what he had, and despite the strain on his resources, Reid had maintained the regu-
lar schedule of Wabana/Sydney convoys instituted after the September sinkings, a
total of 16 being run each way during October. In the end, net protection was in-
stalled off the loading piers and provisions were made to allow only two ships to
load at a time while being protected by escort vessels.
75
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While the feared German invasion had not occurred, it still seemed to many of-
ficials and local residents that Newfoundland was at the front lines of the Battle of
the Atlantic. In the space of nine months, St. John’s had been attacked with torpe-
does and faced an air raid scare, four ore carriers had been sunk at Bell Island, and
Newfoundland’s vital link with mainland Canada had been sent to the bottom of the
Gulf with tremendous loss of life. In Gander, Stephenville, Lewisporte, Botwood,
Argentia, Bell Island, and countless outposts across the island and in Labrador,
armed servicemen guarded military and civilian facilities. The city of St. John’s
and its environs bristled with heavy artillery and anti-aircraft guns, boom defences
and anti-torpedo nets protected the harbour filled with Canadian, British, and
American warships, and American and Canadian aircraft patrolled overhead. His-
tory shows that the Battle of the Atlantic, and indeed the war in general, was ap-
proaching a climax during this period and no one quite knew which way it would
go. Still reeling from the fall disasters, the tense population of St. John’s were soon
reminded that the enemy also walked among them.
On 12 December, a fire broke out in the attic of the Knights of Columbus hos-
tel in St. John’s. The building had been built to provide a recreation facility for mili-
tary and merchant marine personnel, and dances, concerts, and other entertain-
ments were held frequently. All were well attended, and the event held that cold De-
cember night was no exception. Uncle Tom’s Barn Dance played to a packed audi-
ence, and the show was broadcast over radio station VOCM. Suddenly there was a
cry of “Fire!” and the broadcast ended. Within 45 minutes, almost 200 people were
dead or injured.
76
The inquiry into the fire, headed by retired Chief Justice Sir Brian
Dunfield, concluded that it was the work of an arsonist, but could not determine if
enemy agents were involved.
77
Regardless, suspicion of enemy action persisted,
and not without some justification. There had been other fires in buildings fre-
quented by military personnel during the same period. The Old Colony Club had
burned with the loss of four lives, and fires had been set at the USO Club on Merry-
meeting Road and the Red Triangle hostel on Water Street. Much was made of the
fact that someone had torched the Knights of Columbus hostel in Halifax shortly
before. Indeed, Governor Walwyn reported to the Dominions Office that major
fires always seemed to occur on the weekends, when the buildings were full of mili-
tary personnel.
78
By the summer of 1943 the pendulum of war had swung in the Allies’ favour,
and by D-Day the following June any serious threat to Newfoundland had all but
disappeared. Even though the Germans never did launch a concerted assault against
Newfoundland, the fear of such had hung over the country for much of the war. To
counter it, the Allies invested hundreds of aircraft, thousands of tons of equipment,
tens of thousands of servicemen, and many millions of dollars to protect this strate-
gically important piece of real estate. Certainly one could suggest that part of this
buildup was due to the competition between the Canadian and American govern-
ments for dominance in Newfoundland, but the Nazis probably also benefited, es-
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pecially in 1942, as much from the mere possibility of attack on Newfoundland as
from any actual incursion. Without this perceived danger, the men and matériel
used to counter it could have been brought to bear elsewhere, from the Western Pa-
cific, to North Africa, to the Mediterranean — all areas where American and Com-
monwealth forces struggled to contain Axis advances. That they were not indicates
just how seriously the Allies viewed both the threat to Newfoundland and its impor-
tance to the war effort.
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